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Abstract
Many papers have found mixed results in studying the relationship between in-
stitutional quality and some of its determinants, namely openness to trade, GDP
per capital and economic globalization. This paper reexamines the relationship
between government institutions and these factors. The main ﬁndings in this
paper is that the three factors have a threshold eﬀect on institutional quality.
Speciﬁcally, there exists a signiﬁcant nonlinear relationship between three mea-
sures of government institutions (government eﬃciency, political stability and the
rule of law) and trade. Moreover, GDP per capita has a signiﬁcant nonlinear eﬀect
on government eﬀectiveness, political stability, regulatory quality, rule of law and
control of corruption. Finally, there is a signiﬁcant nonlinear relationship between
each of the six measures of institutional quality and globalization. Some of the
ﬁndings are robust to controlling for average IQ levels and regional grouping of
countries while others are not. Speciﬁcally, the results show that the nonlinear
relationship was robust only two measures of institutional quality both for trade
and GDP per capita. Accounting for the level of IQ revealed a signiﬁcant nonlin-
ear relationship between Voice and Accountability and both trade and GDP per
capita.
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1 Introduction
It's common knowledge nowadays among economists and political scientists that
government institutions play a crucial role when it comes to the question of whether
or not citizens of modern states beneﬁt or are making better use of the resources they
already have in order to improve their economic and social situation. It's also largely
documented that only institutions of good quality are able to promote development
(Easterly, 2001; Acemoglu et al., 2001, 2002; Easterly and Levine, 2003; Rodrik et al.,
2004). However, deﬁning what is the quality of institutions or good governance has not
been an easy task as conceptual divergences appear in many of the proposed deﬁnitions.
The widely spread idea is that institutions, as a means by which authority is ex-
ercised (Kaufmann et al., 2004), are of good quality if they have a positive impact on
the quality of life that is enjoyed by citizens of a country (Huther and Shah, 2005).
However, this conception may not exclude some or all of the aspects of a personal rule
regime. On the other hand, the power-exercising characteristics of institutions per-
tains to the "output" side of the regulating relations of a state to its citizens so that
high-quality institutions are those that are impartial in implementing laws and policies
(Rothstein and Teorell, 2008).
Nevertheless, the question of what determines the quality of institution is well estab-
lished in the literature. The determinants of institutional quality include climatic and
geographical factors (Acemoglu et al., 2001), the legal origin deriving from the colonial
heritage of countries (La Porta et al., 1999; Straub, 2000), the rent-seeking opportunities
resulting from the presence of natural resources (Ades and di Tella, 1999; Chong and
Zanforlin, 2000; Treisman, 2000) and openness to trade (Knack and Keefer, 1995; Laf-
font and N'Guessan, 1999; Wei, 2000; Islam and Montenegro, 2002). Kalonda-Kanyama
and Kodila-Tedika (2012) recently showed that average national IQs positively aﬀect
government institutions.
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In this paper, we reexamine the link between government institutions and their
traditional determinants. We found a signiﬁcant nonlinear relationship between three
measures of government institutions and trade. The three measures are government
eﬃciency, political stability and the rule of law. In addition, we found a signiﬁcant
nonlinear eﬀect of GDP per capita on government eﬀectiveness, political stability, reg-
ulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption. However, the nonlinear eﬀect
of GDP per capita disappears when we account for the nonlinear eﬀect of economic
globalization. The ﬁndings in this paper suggest that trade has a positive but dimin-
ishing eﬀect on government eﬀectiveness, political stability and on the rule of law. In
addition, there exists a threshold level of trade beyond which the positive eﬀect of trade
on the quality of government institution becomes decreasing. Moreover, there exists
a critical level beyond which GDP per capita positively aﬀects institutional quality.
Finally, we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant nonlinear relationship between each of the six measures
of institutional quality and globalization. More speciﬁcally, there is a critical level of
economic globalization beyond which globalization has a positive eﬀect on government
institutions.
We check the robustness of the above ﬁndings by accounting for the level of intelli-
gence as measured by the national average IQ (Kalonda-Kanyama and Kodila-Tedika,
2012) and regional grouping of countries. The results show that the nonlinear relation-
ship in trade is robust only for political stability and the rule of law. On the other
hand, the nonlinear relationship in GDP per capita was signiﬁcant only for the rule of
law and the control corruption. It is important to note that controlling for the level of
IQ revealed a signiﬁcant nonlinear relationship between Voice and Accountability and
trade on the one hand, and between Voice an Accountability and GDP per capita on
the other hand. Finally, the nonlinear relationship in globalization was signiﬁcant only
for the control of corruption and for the rule of law.
3
The paper is organized in six sections, including this introduction. The second
section focuses on a preliminary exploration of the relationship between government
institutions and three determinants of institutional quality, namely trade, GDP per
capita and economic globalization. The empirical model is discussed in section 3 and
regression results are presented in section 4. Section 5 discusses the robustness of the
ﬁndings while section 6 concludes.
2 Preliminary Analysis
This section graphically analyses the relationship between the six measures of gov-
ernment institutions included in our analysis and three of traditional determinants of
institutional quality. The three determinants are GDP per capita, trade and globaliza-
tion. The main message conveyed in this section is that the relationship between each
of the three determinants and diverse measures of government institutions may not be
linear.
The eﬀect of GDP per capita
An examination of Figure 1 suggests that a nonlinear relationship exists between
each of the six measures of government institutions and GDP per capita. In each of
the 6 graphs, the log of GDP per capita is represented on the horizontal axis while
the measures of government institutions are represented on the vertical axis. We have
plotted the ﬁtted curve of the estimated quadratic regression model where the depen-
dent variable is an index of institutional quality, and where we use both the linear and
the quadratic terms of the log of the GDP per capital as explanatory variables. The
estimated model is GIi = α+ β lgdpcapi + γ lgdpcapi × lgdpcapi + i, where GIi is an
index of government institutional quality for the ith country in the sample, lgdpcap is
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log of GDP per capita and  is the error term.
The estimated coeﬃcients in the above regression models are all signiﬁcant. The
estimate of β is negative and strongly signiﬁcant in the regression models where the
dependent variables are government eﬃciency (-1.938 with p-value = 0.001), regulatory
quality (-1.709 with p-value = 0.001) and rule of law (-2.829 with p-value = 0.000). How-
ever, βˆ is only marginally signiﬁcant in the regressions where the dependent variables
are political stability (-1.527 with p-value = 0.077) and voice and accountability(-1.213
with p-value = 0.090). On the other hand, γˆ is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level
when the dependent variables are government eﬃciency (0.152 with p-value = 0.000),
regulatory quality (0.135 with p-value = 0.000) and rule of law (0.201 with p-value =
0.000). The estimated coeﬃcients of γ in the models with political stability (0.118) and
voice and accountability (0.098) are signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The robust p-values for
these estimates are respectively 0.014 and 0.018.
Accounting for the nonlinear relation in GDP per capital explains more than 74%
of the variations in the measures of institutional quality for government eﬃciency
(R2 = 74.4%), political stability (R2 = 79.8%) and regulatory quality (R2 = 74.4%).
On the other hand, the estimated proportion of the variations in the rule of law and
voice accountability are respectively 46.1% and 50.9%. These preliminary results are
suggestive of the existence of an U-shaped relationship between all the measure of gov-
ernment institutions and GDP per capita. Our task is to check if such a relationship is
robust when other determinants of government institutions are accounted for.
The eﬀect of trade
Figure 2 plots each the measures of government institutional quality against open-
ness to trade. We have excluded in this ﬁgure all the countries in the sample for which
the GDP share of trade was higher than 150% as we considered these countries as out-
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liers. The distribution of dots in each of the graphs of Figure 2 does not show any
evidence of a signiﬁcant nonlinear relationship between each of the measures of gov-
ernment institution and trade. In fact, even a linear relationship is not signiﬁcant in a
simple regression model in which each of the measures of institutional quality serves as
the dependent variable.
The results from the estimation of the regression model that accounts only for the
nonlinearity in trade as the independent variable show that βˆ and γˆ are both not
signiﬁcant in all the six regression. At this point, we shall only point to the fact
that the sign of βˆ is consistently positive in all the regression while the sign of γˆ is
consistently negative. Our aim in this paper is to check whether controlling for other
determinants of government institutions will reveal a nonlinear relationship between
government institutions and openness to trade.
The eﬀect of globalization
In contrast to Figure 2 where the nonlinear relation between government institutions
and trade was not discernible and not conﬁrmed by the preliminary regression analysis,
Figure 3 portrays a recognizable nonlinear ﬁtted curve of the preliminary regression
models for government eﬀectiveness, regulatory quality, the rule of law and the control
of corruption. However, it is important to mention that both estimated coeﬃcients of
interest, that is βˆ and γˆ, are not signiﬁcant in the regression models where regulatory
quality is the dependent variable. The preliminary estimations show that βˆ is negative
and signiﬁcant at the 5% level when the dependent variable is government eﬃciency
(-0.038 with p-value = 0.023) and at the 1% level in the regression where the rule of
law(-0.055 with p-value = 0.002) and the control of corruption (-0.071 with p-value =
0.000) are the dependent variables. On the other hand, the value of βˆ is negative, but
not signiﬁcant in the regression where the dependent variables are political stability
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and regulatory quality.
Turning to the value of γˆ, the preliminary results show that it is 0.001 and signiﬁcant
at the 1% level in the regressions where the dependent variable is either government
eﬃciency, regulatory quality, the rule of law, or the control of corruption. While it
is only marginally signiﬁcant in the regression model with political stability as the
dependent variable (γˆ = 0.0003 with p-value = 0.086), it is not signiﬁcant in the
regression where voice and accountability is the dependent variable (γˆ = 0.0003 with
p-value = 0.198). In whole, the nonlinear relation in globalization explains more than
54% of the variations in the measure of the control of corruption (R2 = 54.4%), of the
rule of law (R2 = 55.4%), of government eﬃciency (R2 = 60.6%), and of the regulatory
quality (R2 = 64.7%). The nonlinear relation explains only 41% of the variations in
the measure of political stability and 43.3% of the variations in the measure of voice
and accountability.
As for the GDP per capita and trade, our purpose in this paper is to check if the
nonlinear relationship in globalization will be robust after accounting for other deter-
minants of government institutions in the models where it is signiﬁcant. In addition,
we shall also check whether or not this relationship becomes signiﬁcant in the models
where it was not. Finally, we shall watch whether the shapes of the relationships that
are depicted in Figure 1, 2, and 3 are robust to the inclusion of the other determinants
of government institutions. The next section consider a more elaborate model of the
determinants of government institutions.
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3 Empirical Model
We estimate the following empirical model:
GIi = α + β varinti + γ varinti × varinti + Z ′iδ + i (1)
where GIi is the institutional quality index for country i, varint is one of our variables
of interest (GDP per capita, trade, globalization), Z = (z1, z1 . . . zk)
′
is the vector of
control variables, and i is the error term that is assumed to be normally and indepen-
dently distributed. Finally, α is the intercept, β and γ are the parameters associated
with the linear and the quadratic terms of the variables of interest, respectively, while
δ = (δ1, δ2, . . . , δk) is the parameter vector for the control variables. Our parameter of
interest are thus β and γ.
We shall respectively consider the following dependent variables, each in a separate
regression model: government eﬃciency (GOV EFF ), political stability (POLSTAB),
regulatory quality (REGQUAL), rule of law (RLAW ), voice and accountability (V&ACC),
and control of corruption (CONTCORR). Apart from our variables of interest, the
set of our independent variables include the exports of natural resources (NATEXP )
as a proportion of total merchandise exports, geographical dummy variables related to
continents in which each country in the sample belong to (Africa, Americas, Asia, Eu-
rope or Oceania), and dummy variables for the legal origins of government institutions
(British, French, German, Socialist or Scandinavian).
Model (1) is estimated by means of 2SLS, to account for possible endogeneity that
results from the inclusion of openness to trade. In fact, while greater openness increases
the demand for better institutions, it may be true that countries with better institutions
may be more open (Islam and Montenegro, 2002). We instrument for trade using the
estimated trade shares from Frankel and Romer (1999) and geographical variables.
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4 Regression Results
Table 1 reports the results from six cross-sectional regressions, one for each of the
measures of institutional quality for the year 2006. Columns (2) − (7) respectively
report the estimated equations for government eﬀectiveness, political stability, regula-
tory quality, rule of law, voice and accountability, and control of corruption. Two key
points are noticeable from Table 1. First, the results show that there exists a signif-
icant nonlinear relationship between trade and three of the measures of institutional
quality, namely government eﬀectiveness, political stability , and the rule of law. The
estimated value of β is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level in the regressions where
POLSTAB and RLAW are the dependent variables, and at the 5% level in the regres-
sion with GOV EFF as dependent variable. On the other hand, the estimated value
of γ is negative and signiﬁcant at the 1% level in all the three regressions. The signif-
icant nonlinear relationship suggests that the eﬀect of trade on the three measures of
government institutions is positive but diminishing.
The second key point from Table 1 is that the relationship between GDP per capital
and all the measures of the quality of government institutions but V&ACC is signif-
icantly nonlinear. The estimated value of β is negative and signiﬁcant at the 1% in
the regressions for GOV EFF , POLSTAB, and RLAW , and at the 5% level in the
regressions for REGQUAL and CONTCORR. On the other hand, the estimated value
of γ is positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% level in the regressions where the dependent
variable is respectively GOV EFF , POLSTAB, RLAW and CONTCORR, and at
the 5% in the regression where the dependent variable is REGQUAL. The signiﬁcant
nonlinear relationship suggests that there exists a threshold level beyond which GDP
per capita has a positive and increasing aﬀect on government institutions.
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On the other hand, Table 2 reports the estimation from a model that incorporates
a measure of economic globalization, the KOF index. The estimated value of β is
negative and signiﬁcant in ﬁve out of six regressions. It is signiﬁcant at the 1% level
in the regressions for RLAW and CONTCORR, at 5% in the regressions where the
dependent variables are POLSTAB and REGQUAL, and at 10% in the regression
with GOV EFF and V&ACC as dependent variables. The estimated value of γ is
positive and signiﬁcant at the 1% in the regressions for POLSTAB, RLAW , and
CONTCORR, at 5% in the regressions for REGQUAL and V&ACC and at 10% in
the regression where GOV EFF is the dependent variable. The nonlinear relationship
suggests that there exists a threshold level beyond which globalization positively aﬀects
institutional quality. It is important to note that the nonlinear relationship in GDP
per capita disappears when the nonlinear eﬀect of globalization is accounted for. In
Table 2, the coeﬃcient of the log of GDP per capita is signiﬁcant at the 1% in all
the regressions, except the one in which CONTCORR is the dependent variable. This
results suggests that GDP per capita has a strong positive eﬀect on institutional quality,
after accounting for globalization.
It is important to note that the ﬁnding in this paper about trade and GDP per capita
contrasts with the existing literature. For example, (Islam and Montenegro, 2002) ﬁnd
that the relationship between institutional quality and trade is linear. However, this
suggests that the eﬀect of trade on institutional quality is the same for all countries in
the sample, regardless of their volume of trade. More ...
The eﬀect of natural resources
Tables 1 and 2 reveals the negative eﬀect of natural resources on institutional qual-
ity. The coeﬃcient of the variable Natexp is negative and signiﬁcant at the 1% in
all the regressions in Table 1. In table 2, the coeﬃcient for natural resources is also
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negative for all the regression and signiﬁcant at the 1% level, except in the regression
where CONTCORR is the dependent variable in which case it is signiﬁcant at 5%.
It is noteworthy that the proportion of the variations in the measures of
institutional quality that is explained by the independent variables ranges
betwwen 60% and 87%. The ﬁnding of the negative eﬀect of natural re-
sources on institutional quality conﬁrm previous studies. Speciﬁcally, ...
found that ...
The eﬀect of legal origin and continental dummies
The regression results in Table 1 show that all the legal origin dummies have a nega-
tive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on GOV EFF and RLAW , and no eﬀect at all on REGQUAL
and CONTCORR when the nonlinear eﬀect of trade and GDP per capita are accounted
for. In addition, all but the socialist legal origin have a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect
on POLSTAB while only the French and socialist legal origin dummies signiﬁcantly af-
fect V&ACC. When globalization is accounted for (Table 2), the results show that the
French legal origin dummy negatively aﬀect all the six measures of institutional qual-
ity while the German dummy negatively and signiﬁcantly aﬀects only GOV EFF and
CONTCORR. Moreover, the British and socialist dummies do not aﬀect REGQUAL
and V&ACC.
Table 1 shows that none of the continental dummies aﬀectsGOV EFF nor CONTCORR
when the nonlinear relationships in trade and GDP per capita are accounted for. The
same remark applies when globalization is accounted for (Table 2), except for the Asian
dummy that is negatively signiﬁcant at the 10% level for CONTCORR. The African
dummy aﬀects none of the six measures of institutional quality in either case. In con-
trast, the remaing continental dummies negatively and signiﬁcantly aﬀect POLSTAB.
Finally, while the Asian dummy negatively and signiﬁcantly aﬀects REGQUAL at the
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5% level and V&ACC at the 10%, the dummy for the Americas and the dummy for
Europe do not aﬀect CONTCORR, REGQUAL, RLAW and V&ACC.
Critical values and the diminishing/increasing eﬀects
Given the signiﬁcant nonlinear relationships between institutional quality measures
and each of the factors of interest (trade, GDP per capita and globalization), as identi-
ﬁed above, one can calculate the critical value of each of the factors of interest such that
its partial eﬀect on the corresponding measure of institutional quality is zero. From
equation (1), the partial eﬀect of each variable of interest is
∂GI
varint
= β + 2γ varint. (2)
Deﬁne varint∗, the value of trade, log(GDP per capita) or globalization index such that
the partial eﬀect in equation 2 is zero. Then solving equation 2 yields:
varint∗ = − β
2× γ . (3)
Table 5 gives the critical values of trade, log(GDP per capita) and globalization for
all the regressions in Table 1 where the nonlinear eﬀects are signiﬁcant. These values
can be interpreted as the threshold values beyond which the eﬀect of the variables of
interest on institutional quality changes the sign. For example, trade has a positive
eﬀect on government eﬀectiveness for all volume of trade that represents less than
98.33% of GDP. On the other hand, it takes a trade-to-GDP ratio less than 96.5% and
61.0% for trade to have a positive eﬀect on political stability and on the rule of law,
respectively. Beyond these values, the eﬀect of trade on institutional quality eventually
becomes negative. Likewise, it takes a GDP per capita higher than 459.43 USD, that
is more than 93.23 USD higher than the GDP per capita of the Democratic Republic
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of the Congo, for GDP per capita to have a positive eﬀect on government eﬀectiveness,
and 1525.37 USD, a little lower than Ghana's GDP per capita in the sample, for GDP
per capita to have a positive eﬀec on the rule of law. Below these levels of GDP per
capita, the eﬀect on institutional quality is eventually negative.
To better understand the above eﬀects, consider Table 6 which depicts the positive
but diminishing eﬀect of trade, and the negative but increasing eﬀects of GDP per
capita and globalization on institutional quality. The numbers in this table are the
calculated eﬀect on the measures of institutional quality, at diﬀerent percentiles of the
value of trade, log(GDP per capita) and globalization. Panel A shows the positive but
diminishing eﬀect of trade on government eﬃciency, political stability and the rule of
law. In combination with Table 5, it follows that trade has positive but diminishing
eﬀect on government eﬃciency for trade-to-GDP ratios less than 98.33%, on political
stability for trade-to-GDP ratios less than 96.5%, and on the rule of law for ratios less
than 61.5%. Once trade volumes hit these thresholds and goes beyond them, the eﬀect
of trade on institutional quality becomes nonpositive.
Panel B and Panel C depict the negative but increasing eﬀect of GDP per capita
and of globalization on institutional quality. It follows that GDP per capita and global-
ization have a negative eﬀect on institutional quality for countries with values less than
the critical values in Table 5. However, this negative eﬀect is increasing with higher
values of GDP per capita and higher levels of globalization until it hits the critical
values (Table 5) at which the eﬀect on institutional variables becomes zero. Beyond
the critical values, GDP per capita and globalization have positive and increasing eﬀect
on institutional variables.
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5 Robustness Checks
To verify the robustness of the above ﬁndings, we account for the level of national
average IQ and for World Bank regional grouping of countries instead of continents.
The data on intelligence (IQ) comes from Lynn and Vanhanen (2002, 2006). The
regional grouping of countries is the World Bank's classiﬁcation of countries in the
following geographical regions: East Asia and the Paciﬁc (EAP ), Europe and Central
Asia (EUCASIA), Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), Middle East and North
Africa (MENA) and Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). A dummy variables was introduced in
the regressions for each of the regional grouping of countries in Table 3. These dummies
were used to check the robustness of the nonlinear relationship in trade and GDP per
capita. For the nonlinear relationship in globalization, the dummies for continents
where used instead, along with IQ levels.
Table 3 reports the regressions in which the level of IQ was signiﬁcant, along with
the nonlinear relationship in both trade and GDP per capita. The results show that the
nonlinear relationship in trade is signiﬁcant only for POLSTAB and RLAW , compared
to the regressions in Table 1. The estimated value of β is positive and signiﬁcant at the
5% level while the estimated value of γ is negative and signiﬁcant at the 5% level. The
nonlinear relationship in GDP per capita is signiﬁcant at the 1% level for RLAW and
CONTCORR. Moreover, accounting for IQ level and geographical grouping revealed
the nonlinear relatioship between V&ACC and both trade and GDP per capita. For
both independent variables, the nonlinear relatioship is signiﬁcant at the 1% level.
Finally, Table 4 shows that the nonlinear relationship in globalization is robust for the
control of corruption and the rule of law.
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6 Conclusion
The objective of this paper was to investigate the nonlinear eﬀect of trade, GDP
per capita and globalization on government institutions. We estimated a cross-section
regression model for each of six measures of institutional quality ﬁrst with trade and
GDP per capita as the independent variables of interest, and then with globalization
as the independent variable of interest. Because of possible endogeneity due to the
inclusion of openness to trade in the regression model of institutional quality, 2SLS was
used as the method of estimation.
The main ﬁnding is that the three variables on interest has a threshold eﬀect on
at least three measures of institutional quality. Openness to trade has a threshold
eﬀect on government eﬀectiveness, political stability and the rule of law; Globalization
has a threshold eﬀect on all the six measures of institutional quality included in our
study while GDP per capita has a threshold eﬀect on ﬁve of them, not including voice
and accountability. The results show that trade has a positive but diminishing eﬀect
on institutional quality, while GDP per capita and globalization has a negative but
increasing eﬀect. The signiﬁcant nonlinear relationship in the variables on interest
allowed us to determine critical values beyond which the their eﬀect changes the sign.
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Figure 1: Government Institutions and GDP per capita
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
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Figure 2: Government Institutions and Trade
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
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Figure 3: Government Institutions and globalization
(a) (b)
(c) (d)
(e) (f)
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Table 1: Main Regression (Year = 2006)
Government Political Regulatory Rule of law Voice and Control of
Variables eﬀectiveness stability quality Accountability corruption
Trade 0.0059** 0.0193*** 0.0662 0.0123*** 0.0061 0.0064
(0.044) (0.000) (0.175) (0.007) (0.308) (0.160)
Trade× Trade -0.00003*** -0.0001*** -0.00002 -0.0001*** -0.00002 -0.000*
(0.009) (0.0000) (0.113) (0.001) (0.222) (0.094)
Natural resources -0.0115*** -0.0056** -0.0073*** -0.0089*** -0.0081*** -0.0074***
(0.000) (0.029) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
lgdpcap -1.741*** -3.2261*** -1.9164** -3.4877*** -1.316 -1.949**
(0.004) (0.007) (0.036) (0.000) (0.273 (0.031)
lgdpcap× lgdpcap 0.142*** 0.2191*** 0.1464** 0.2380*** 0.0941 0.1483***
(0.000) (0.001) (0.005) (0.000) (0.165) (0.004)
Africa 0.0618 0.0633 0.0239 0.1223 -0.3901 0.272
(0.772) (0.814) (0.945) (0.662) (0.0502) (0.937)
Americas -0.2242 -0.4075** -0.1705 -0.5247** 0.901 -0.1675
(0.224) (0.026) (0.597) (0.032) (0.148) (0.603)
Asia 0.0071 -0.7424*** -0.1345 -0.2113 -0.7199* -0.1288
(0.974) (0.004) (0.689) (0.479) (0.092) (0.701)
Europe -0.2003 -0.7519*** -0.0639 -0.3690 0.2349 -0.0633
(0.306) (0.002) (0.845) (0.158) (0.592) (0.846)
British legal origin -0.4381*** -0.4906** 0.0144 -0.2811* -0.0891 -0.0199
(0.008) (0.011) (0.912) (0.076) (0.609) (0.880)
French legal origin -0.5976*** -0.3302* -0.1288 -0.0467*** -0.3725*** -0.1236
(0.000) (0.051) (0.290) (0.005) (0.003) (0.309)
German legal origin -0.4445*** -0.3159** -0.1382 -0.3455** -0.1195 -0.1390
(0.002) (0.032) (0.242) (0.013) (0.360) (0.241)
Socialist legal origin -0.55506*** 0.1919 0.0465 -0.4809** -0.4823* 0.0528
(0.001) (0.401) (0.803) (0.013) (0.095) (0.779)
Constant 4.7838** 10.780** 5.471 12.258*** 4.3493 5.5902
(0.045) (0.036) (0.151) (0.000) (0.364) (0.139)
Observations 104 104 104 113 104 104
R-squared 86.6 60.9 75.7 74.6 68.6 75.4
Robust p-values in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2: Regression with economic globalization(Year = 2006)
Government Political Regulatory Rule of law Voice and Control of
Variables eﬀectiveness stability quality accountability corruption
Globalization (KOF) -0.0652* -0.1178** -0.0722** -0.0508*** -0.1060* -0.154***
(0.057) (0.022) (0.045) (0.001) (0.053) (0.000)
KOF ×KOF 0.0005* 0.0011*** 0.0006** 0.0012*** 0.0009** 0.001***
(0.050) (0.009) (0.036) (0.002) (0.048) (0.0.001)
Natural resources -0.0067*** -0.0080*** -0.0056*** -0.0062*** -0.006*** -0.005**
(0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.011) (0.022)
lgdp 0.6922*** 0.5752*** 0.6264*** 0.7468*** 0.3397*** 0.716***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Africa -0.0391 0.1448 0.0009 -0.1291 -0.3397 -0.433
(0.900) (0.449) (0.998) (0.792) (0.451) (0.434)
Americas -0.3027 -0.3847** -0.2004 -0.4522 0.1490 -0.533
(0.339) (0.014) (0.593) (0.218) (0.724) (0.333)
Asia -0.2917 -9377*** -0.494** -0.4596 -0.7901* -0.889*
(0.331) (0.000) (0.014) (0.196) (0.062) (0.096)
Europe -0.3176 -1.1181*** -0.1960 -0.4928 0.0065 -0.680
(0.331) (0.000) (0.611) (0.227) (0.990) (0.233)
British legal origin -0.6252*** -0.6932*** -0.1072 -0.5017*** -0.1342 -0.969***
(0.000) (0.004) (0.402) (0.009) (0.533) (0.000)
French legal origin -0.8660*** -0.5817** -3090 *** -0.7494*** -0.5022*** -1.205***
(0.000) (0.011) (0.004) (0.000) (0.006) (0.000)
German legal origin -0.3434*** -0.0887 -0.0123 -0.1671 -0.0352 -0.634***
(0.000) (0.707) (0.915) (0.347) (0.870) (0.004)
Socialist legal origin -0.7355*** 0.1745 -0.0811 -0.6386** -0.3774 -1.211***
(0.000) (0.556) (0.634) (0.010) (0.238) (0.000)
Constant -2.953*** -1.1891 -2.9185*** -0.8801 0.5826 0.183**
(0.002) (0.443) (0.009) (0.517) (0.748) (0.902)
Measure of natural natexp fuels natexp natexp natexp natexp
resources
Observations 102 102 102 102 102 102
R-squared 87.3 59.8 77.6 76.1 67.4 76.8
Robust p-values in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3: Main Regression (Year = 2006)
Control of Political Rule of Voice and
Variables corruption stability law Accountability
Trade 0.005 0.017** 0.009** 0.019***
(0.287) (0.014) (0.025) (0.006)
Trade× Trade -0.000 -0.0001** -0.0002** -0.0001***
(0.201) (0.038) (0.39) (0.001)
Natural resources -0.003 -0.010*** -0.004** -0.011***
(0.128) (0.001) (0.022) (0.000)
lgdpcap -2.674*** -1.502 -1.953*** -3.544***
(0.006) (0.255) (0.005) (0.002)
lgdpcap× lgdpcap 0.183*** 0.113 0.138*** 0.233***
(0.001) (0.113) (0.001) (0.000)
IQ 0.026** 0.025* 0.024** 0.036**
(0.026) (0.097) (0.014) (0.014)
East Asia & Paciﬁc 0.463*** -0.469* -0.457*** -0.389
(0.002) (0.091) (0.001) (0.264)
Europe and Central Asia -0.234 -0.155 -0.489** 0.259
(0.389) (0.548) (0.034) (0.532)
Latin America & the Caribbeans -0.2354 0.087 -0.525*** 0.648***
(0.175) (0.643) (0.000) (0.000)
South Asia -0.371 -0.528 -0.071 0.531
(0.271) (0.213) (0.808) (0.184)
Sub-Saharan Africa 0.300 0.884** 0.164 0.850**
(0.257) (0.015) (0.392) (0.015)
British legal origin -0.477** -0.178 -0.195 0.250
(0.036) (0.349) (0.1201) (0.116)
French legal origin -0.737*** -0.221 -0.380** 0.053
(0.001) (0.286) (0.017) (0.763)
German legal origin -0.841** -0.460*** -0.352** -0.349**
(0.038) (0.004) (0.034) (0.026)
Socialist legal origin -1.114*** 0.028 -0.637*** -0.119
(0.000) (0.907) (0.000) (0.702)
Constant 7.504* 1.278 4.377 8.680*
(0.072) (0.135) (0.135) (0.087)
Observations 94 94 94 94
R-squared 83.2 86.5 85.7 90.9
Measure of Natural resources Natexp Fuels Fuels Natexp
Robust p-values in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 4: Main Regression (Year = 2006)
Control of Rule of
Variables corruption law
KOF Index -0.112*** -0.112***
(0.008) (0.007)
KOF ×KOF 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.006) (0.006)
Natural resources -0.004* -0.002
(0.089) (0.356)
lgdpcap 0.580*** 0.585***
(0.000) (0.000)
IQ 0.020* 0.020*
(0.089) (0.070)
Africa -0.104 0.116
(0.844) (0.739)
Americas -0.508 -0.467
(0.155) (0.298)
Asia -0.778* -0.378
(0.097) (0.213)
Europe -0.582 -0.387
(0.244) (0.282)
British legal origin -0.820*** -0.365**
(0.000) (0.043)
French legal origin -1.081*** -0.632***
(0.000) (0.000)
German legal origin -0.692** -0.913
(0.010) (0.264)
Socialist legal origin -1.395*** -0.820***
(0.000) (0.000)
Constant -2.006 -2.633**
(0.187) (0.035)
Observations 93 93
R-squared 82.2 83.3
Robust p-values in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 5: Critical Values of trade, Log(GDP per capita) and Globalization
Critical Value of
Dependent Variable Trade Log(GDP per capita) Globalization
Government Eﬃciency(GOV EFF ) 98.33 6.13 65.20
Political Stability (POLSTAB) 96.50 7.36 53.55
Regulatory Quality (REGQUAL) − 6.55 60.17
Rule of Law (RLAW ) 61.50 7.33 21.17
Voice and Accountability (V&ACC) − − 58.89
Control of Corruption (CONTCORR) − 6.57 77.00
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